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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-2374 
_____________ 
 
LUCIO ARRIAGA-HERNANDEZ, 
                                Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                  Respondent 
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM REINSTATEMENT 
OF A PRIOR ORDER OF REMOVAL 
(Agency No. A098-007-534) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 21, 2017) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________________ 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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  Petitioner Lucio Arriaga Hernandez petitions for review of the reinstatement of 
his deportation order. He argues that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and his 
removal proceedings violated due process. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss 
his petition for review.  
I. 
 Hernandez is a citizen of Mexico who until recently was residing in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania.  On May 2, 2016, Hernandez parked in the small parking lot of a 
convenience store. He intended to wire money from the store. As Hernandez got out of 
his car and began walking towards the store, he saw Department of Homeland Security 
agents approaching him. According to DHS, the agents had been looking for another 
person who lived in the same building as the convenience store.  
 The DHS report states that, when the agents saw Hernandez, they “became 
suspicious of the individual” because “they were unable to identify the individual.”1 As 
the agents approached, Hernandez turned and walked back to his car, got in, and began 
backing out of the parking lot. However, the agents “were able to stop” Hernandez and 
prevent him from leaving.2 When asked for identification, Hernandez said he was a 
Mexican citizen so he didn’t have identification.  
 While Hernandez was detained, DHS learned his identity and that he was subject 
to a 2013 order of removal. Accordingly, DHS initiated procedures for reinstatement of 
                                                          
1 App. II at 7.  
2 App. II at 7. 
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that order. Hernandez was removed from the country on or about May 13, 2016, but his 
petition for review of his removal followed.  
II.3 
 Hernandez argues that the statement he made to DHS agents about his identity 
should have been suppressed because it was obtained while he was detained and not free 
to leave. His detention, he argues, constituted an arrest without probable cause or even 
the reasonable suspicion required for a Terry4 stop. Hernandez concedes that ordinarily 
when an illegal arrest leads only to the disclosure of identity, the identity cannot be 
suppressed.5 However, Hernandez argues that because “the only reason DHS had to stop 
[him] was based on racial or ethnic profiling,” this stop was an “egregious” violation of 
the Fourth Amendment and therefore the “identity rule” does not apply.6  
 Assuming that agents violated Hernandez’s Fourth Amendment rights during the 
stop in the parking lot, we hold that on this record, the violation was not an egregious 
one.  
                                                          
3 This Court has jurisdiction to review constitutional or legal questions raised pertaining 
to the reinstatement order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Verde-Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen., 
734 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2013).  
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
5 I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (“The ‘body’ or identity of a 
defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a 
fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or 
interrogation occurred.”). 
6 See Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he exclusionary 
rule may apply in removal proceedings where an alien shows ‘egregious violations of 
Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.’” (quoting Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051)). 
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 As we articulated in Olivia-Ramos, whether a violation is “egregious,” such that 
evidence of an individual’s identity may be suppressed, depends on the “totality of the 
circumstances” of the stop, including: 
[W]hether [the petitioner] can establish intentional violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, whether the seizure itself was so gross or unreasonable in 
addition to being without a plausible legal ground, (e.g., when the initial 
illegal stop is particularly lengthy, there is an unnecessary and menacing 
show or use of force, etc.), whether improper seizures, illegal entry of 
homes, or arrests occurred under threats, coercion or physical abuse, the 
extent to which the agents reported to unreasonable shows of force, and 
finally, whether any seizures or arrests were based on race or perceived 
ethnicity.7 
In Olivia-Ramos, we also adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales.8 That decision noted that, “even where the 
seizure is not especially severe, it may nevertheless qualify as an egregious violation if 
the stop was based on race.”9 However, in that case the Second Circuit ultimately 
concluded that the border patrol agent’s stop of a seventeen-year-old boy walking into a 
gas station parking lot was not egregious even though “the arresting agent . . . had no 
valid reason or suspicion to justify his stop.”10 
 Here, by contrast, the agents did have reason to suspect Hernandez. When 
Hernandez spotted the agents, he changed course and walked back to his car instead of 
                                                          
7 Id. at 279. An egregious violation may also be shown where the violation “undermined 
the reliability of the evidence in dispute.” Id. at 278. Here, however, nothing before us 
raises doubts about the veracity of the evidence obtained as a result of Hernandez’s stop. 
8 Id. at 278 (citing Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).  
9 Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235.  
10 Id. at 236. 
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continuing towards the grocery store.11 Only after Hernandez turned around and got in his 
car to leave did the officers prevent him from leaving the parking lot. Furthermore, this 
case presents no other indications of egregiousness as outlined in Olivia-Ramos: There is 
no evidence that the stop was particularly lengthy, coercive, or threatening. The agents 
who stopped Hernandez did not use force against him, nor did they intrude on private 
property.12 Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that that Hernandez was 
stopped solely because of his apparent ethnicity or national origin. Although it is 
certainly conceivable that Hernandez would not have been stopped if his features did not 
suggest his national origin, there is scant (if any) evidence in the record to support that 
conclusion.13  Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Hernandez’s stop was egregious. As 
a result, even if his stop violated the Fourth Amendment, the evidence of his identity may 
not be suppressed.   
Hernandez also argues that the reinstatement procedures violate his due process 
rights because he was unable to assert possible defenses to removal such as eligibility for 
DACA or VAWA protections. However, as the petitioner notes in his brief, in Ponta-
Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States,14 we held that reinstatement of removal 
                                                          
11 See Cervantes-Cuevas v. I.N.S., 797 F.2d 707, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding a basis 
for reasonable suspicion when agents knew undocumented individuals were fleeing an 
area and the petitioner slowed down, then sped up, upon seeing the Border Patrol car).  
12 See Olivia-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 279 (noting that “inva[sion] of private property” and 
“illegal entry of homes” factor into whether or not a seizure is an egregious one). 
13 See Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 237 (“[The petitioner] offers nothing other than his 
own intuition to show that race played a part in the arresting agent’s decision.”). 
14 557 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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procedures do not violate due process guarantees.15  Therefore, we are constrained by 
precedent, and cannot review his reinstatement order on due process grounds.16    
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we deny the petition to review the order of 
reinstatement.   
                                                          
15 Id. at 163.  
16 This court may review whether the removal order was properly reinstated. See id. at 
165 (remanding a reinstatement order because the petitioner may not have reentered 
illegally and the original removal order may have been invalidated). However, Hernandez 
does not dispute the factual underpinnings that made reinstatement appropriate here. 
